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Abstract  
An enquiry is made about the nature of the soul at the dawn of premodernism, at the dawn of modernism 
and in the era of postmodernism. The enquiry is used to support the view that, even in today’s politically 
correct and morally relativist world, science (and by default science education) should continue to predicate 
its activity on, and judge its success by, a commonsense appeal to experience, and not give in to lesser 
forms of validation.  
 
 
Introduction  
This paper briefly and narrowly discusses understandings of the human soul in so far as 
these can be extracted from the writings of Plato and Berkeley. It also briefly examines 
present day writings concerning cognition and learning and the importance of 
metacognition in concept change and development. The discussion is used to put the view 
that science (and by default science education) should, even in today’s politically correct 
and morally relativist world, continue to predicate its activity on, and judge its success 
by, a commonsense appeal to experience and not give in to lesser forms of validation.  
 
In general usage the word ‘soul’ is often employed to denote the spiritual, rational, and 
immortal dimensions of humankind or the thinking agent in humankind. However, it has 
wider connotations: intelligence, feelings, fantasy, imagination, understanding, reflection, 
remembering, self knowledge and noetic recollection. Soul in this paper is understood 
generally in the sense of perception and loosely as mind, although such usage carries with 
it considerable simplification and some insufficiency through the anachronistic licence it 
entails. Although no discussion of soul involving either Plato or Berkeley can be 
complete without acknowledging its spiritual and immortality dimensions, these are not 
the focus of interest. To make this claim is not to argue that science (and by default 
science education) is without its social and spiritual dimensions, or that in safe and civil 
society it/they (science/science education) should be allowed to proceed willy-nilly 
without acknowledgment of those wider dimensions.  
 
The issue of truth and soul was alive in pre-Socratic times (Burnett, 1908) but in this 
paper Plato’s Republic (Jowett, 2005a) and two of his dialogues, the Phaedo (Plato, 
2003) and the Timaeus (Plato, 2005) are used to illustrate the early origins of the linking 
of truth and mind. Berkeley’s “Essay towards a New Theory of Vision” (Berkeley, 1948) 
and his “Principles of Human Knowledge” (Berkeley, 1952) are used to discuss a 
17th century explanation of the understanding of this coupling. The works of several 
authors (Flavell, 1976; Hewson, 1982; Hewson & Hewson, 1984; Hewson & Thorley, 
1989; Hewson, 1981; Posner, Strike, Hewson & Gertzog, 1982) are used to discuss mind 
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and truth in present educational praxis. Each brief discussion (Plato, Berkeley and the 
postmoderns) is in the nature of a single snapshot and the paper seeks to identify nothing 
more than a theme common to the three: viz., that truth is an important notion in science 
and by default in science education – a point that sometimes appears lost in radical 
constructivism and considered too troublesome and difficult under postmodernism.  
 
Because the paper seeks only to make the general point outlined in the opening 
paragraph, rather than to go more deeply into the nature of the soul per se, Aristotle 
(1952) receives only passing mention, Berkeley is discussed with very little reference to 
Locke (1975) and no more than passing acknowledgment of Marlebranche (1694), 
Descartes (1955) and Hume (2005). Likewise, given von Glasersfeld’s ironic claim that 
Locke uses his term ‘reflection’ with the meaning “that is fundamental in cognitive 
construction since Piaget” (1995, p. 31) – the interesting implication of this claim is that 
Berkeley and Hume failed to extinguish Locke – the postmoderns are spoken of 
separately rather than through their links in the great conversation through Piaget (1979) 
back to Hume (2005). A more complete discussion would of course redress this and other 
lacunas.  
 
 
Three Treatments of Soul  
 
Soul at the ‘dawn’ of premodernism  
 
Plato was “first among the Greeks” to conceive a method of knowledge even though he 
“barely distinguished that method from the substance of truth” (Jowett, 2005a, p. 1). 
Amongst the many other accolades awarded to Plato by Jowett is an acknowledgment of 
the division of the mind into the rational, concupiscent and irascible elements (2005a, p. 
2). In Book Nine of the Republic, the soul is depicted as a composite: a chariot and 
charioteer drawn by two horses – one good and the other bad. The good loves “honour, 
and modesty and temperance” and the bad is the “mate of insolence and pride”. The good 
is guided by “word and admonition”; the bad hardly yields “to whip and spur”. Different 
interpretations have been given: Plato himself urges a reason and passion interpretation. 
Augustine (1952) was later to interpret the soul as will, knowledge and memory.  
 
In the Timaeus (2005), Plato presents an analogy between the soul of the world and the 
soul of man. The soul of the world consists of the same (the unchanging) and the other 
(the changing) – cf. the “fixed” stars and the moving planets. God is prior to the world, 
the soul is prior to body and ideas (forms) are prior to the sensible objects. The “same” in 
the world soul is the thought of God which gave law and variability to the material copy 
of that world which has its perturbations and disturbances (the other). In the human soul, 
reason is the “homologue” of the “same” and passion and appetite of “the other”. In this 
sense, reason works towards bringing order to the chaos. In humankind, the three parts of 
the soul (the rational, the passionate and the appetitive) are given bodily physiology 
through head, heart and belly. The composite (chariot) metaphor with its insights into the 
rational and erotic mysteries of the soul remains powerful in psychology and education to 
this day. It could be used in modern times to explain metacognition: the charioteer (mind 
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or will) in moving towards an objective must balance reason and the erotic/appetitive 
forces and coincidently audit itself at work in this process.  
 
In the Phaedo (Plato, 2001), Plato partly explains the pilgrimage of the soul – that series 
of wanderings and rebirths by which it gains understandings of the forms and 
successively comes to some grasping of truth through the noesis that the process allows. 
Thus, for the most metaphysical of the metaphysicians, truth is that thing sought after by 
the human soul. The nature of the ‘science’ through which truth was sought in the 
corrupted real world of objects is discussed in enjoyable detail by Jowett (2005b) in his 
illuminating “Introduction and Analysis” to the Timaeus.  
 
Soul at the “dawn” of modernism  
 
In his De Anima (1952), Aristotle was soon to demolish the pilgrimage of the soul, 
bringing the soul down to earth in a manner substantially different from Plato. In this 
work of science, the like of which has never been seen since, Aristotle allowed the soul 
some independence and will of its own in that it was able, through reason, to seek the 
truth about the real world of material things through the use of a logic not predicated on 
Platonic noesis. The battle over this departure was continuing when Berkeley (1685-
1753) began to develop an immaterialist explanation of the presence of objects consistent 
with commonsense empiricism (Berkeley, 1948, 1949). Berkeley among the moderns 
glimpsed the coming scepticism inherent in commonsense access to scientific laws that 
has been troublesome since Hume (1711-1776) (2005). Locke (1632-1704) (1975) had 
allowed access to the causal properties of objects through sensation and reflection. 
Descartes (1596-1650) (1955) had introduced the “I” to explain intuitive knowledge of 
the soul (self) and urged the duality of mind and body. Hobbes (1588-1679) (1991) had 
argued that that causation was in the properties of things rather than in God’s will.  
 
Berkeley’s central explanation of the ‘reality’ reached through human perception (to be is 
to perceive or be perceived, or to act or will) is not without its contradictions. For 
example, Berkeley grants that such reality (his office table, for example [Berkeley, 1952, 
paragraph 3]) does exist independent of human experience simply because it is 
continually perceived (or perhaps willed) by God (Berkeley, 1957, paragraph 3). It does 
not materialise and dematerialise as a function of human perception. Such reality is 
organised according to the laws of nature, such laws being accessible to humans by virtue 
of commonsense perception predicated on matter (causal property) which exists only in 
the form of ideas under the action of spirit. In no sense does Berkeley suggest that 
humans could invent or construct the laws of nature (especially causation of any kind) in 
the manner of constructivism. God’s regular and permanent laws of nature (and the 
efficient causes therein) were there for humans to know about (Berkeley, 1952, paragraph 
105) through simple commonsense perception. Berkeley’s position was one of positive 
idealism consistent with commonsense access to real objects – objects which continue to 
exist when not perceived by human intellects.  
 
Some of the contradictions referred to earlier go to the heart of Berkeley’s immaterialism. 
In the “Principles of Human Knowledge” Berkeley denies material but accepts that there 
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are material substances (1949, paragraphs 19, 37) and that the soul is a spiritual substance 
(1949, paragraphs 27, 36) but that these substances are not known as ideas are known 
(Luce, 1944, p. 339). In the “Essay towards a New Theory of Vision” (Berkeley, 1948, 
paragraphs 46, 64, 99, 117, 155), objects accessible by touch are spoken of as existing 
without the mind (Flage, 2004, p. 5). In the “Principles of Human Knowledge” (1949, pp. 
40, 87-89), Berkeley also allows that there are bodies distinct from the mind but that such 
bodies are sensible but not material (Luce, 1944, p. 339). Flage (2004, p. 5) suggests that 
these contradictions may have resulted because Berkeley may have been sometimes 
speaking in the ‘vulgar’ or because they are inherent in the difference between the “Essay 
towards a New Theory of Vision” (thought of by some as a work of science) and the 
“Principles of Human Knowledge” (thought of by some as highly metaphysical). Luce 
(1944, p. xviii) explains contradictions of this kind in terms of Berkeley’s development of 
his immaterialist thesis.  
 
According to Berkeley, the ideas upon which the spirit acts are inert, in the sense that 
ideas do not cause other ideas: this causation is the activity of the spirit. Some ideas 
arrive involuntarily (immediately) and are active and lively. Other ideas arrive more 
slowly (mediately) but the process is not well explained. In Berkeley, existing objects are 
immediately perceived (Pappas, 2000, pp. 147-182). A controversy continues about 
whether Berkeley allows mediate perception: such an admission would certainly spell 
trouble for his abstraction argument.  
 
Berkeley’s attack on the primary qualities (see Table 1) is part of his questioning of 
Locke’s explanation of abstraction. Under Locke, the immediate ideas generated by 
primary qualities represent the true qualities (natures) of those objects. The secondary 
qualities ascertained through mediate ideas were in part ascertained through abstraction 
understood as that process of obtaining general terms encompassing all of the ideas 
representing properties common to the term. Berkeley dismissed this and other forms of 
abstraction (see Table 2), arguing instead that the general term is not abstracted but rather 
consists of “any one of several particular ideas, any one of which it indifferently suggests 
to the mind” (Berkeley, 1952, Introduction, p. 11). Following this reasoning, the 
secondary qualities (mediate or “less true” ideas) are not abstractions of the kind Locke 
would have them to be.  
 
Table 1: Locke’s primary and secondary qualities  
 
Classification  Ideas Generated by the Qualities  
Primary Qualities  Solidity, extension, figure, motion or rest, and 
number (II viii 9) 
Secondary Qualities  Taste, smell and sound (II viii 10), colour, heat 
and cold  
Source: adapted from Locke, 1975, II, viii, pp. 9-10  
 
Berkeley’s rejection of abstraction is in turn only a part of his larger ontology, viz., the 
immateriality of perceived objects. This immateriality consists of objects being composed 
of ideas. Ideas are acted upon by spirit – “simple, undivided, active being” (Berkeley, 
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1952, paragraph 27) which when perceiving ideas is called “understanding” (Berkeley, 
1952, paragraph 27), which when it operates on the ideas is called “will”
 
 
Table 2: Berkeley’s acceptance and rejection of abstraction  
 
#  Kind of 
Abstraction  
Explanation  Example  Admitted?  
1  Simple parts or 
qualities from 
various 
combinations of 
them  
Parts which can exist separately 
in themselves can be abstracted 
from an object in which they are 
combined  
A hand can be thought of 
separate from a body. 
Berkeley can, for 
example, imagine a man 
with two heads  
Admitted  
(Introduction, 
p. 10)  
2  Quality from 
quality or mode 
from substance  
Qualities perceived together but 
which cannot exist separately 
cannot be abstracted  
The blackness or 
whiteness of a particular 
extension (a person say 
or a piece of coal or a 
snowball or the hand in 1 
above) cannot be 
perceived in the absence 
of the substance. The 
colour of the hand cannot 
exist separately from the 
extension (space 
occupied) of the hand nor 
can the motion of a body 
exist separately from the 
body itself. Colour and 
motion cannot be 
abstracted.  
Not Admitted 
(Introduction, 
p. 10)  
3  General notions 
or terms  
It is impossible to abstract a 
general notion from the 
particulars of the many which 
general notion is then 
“prescinded” from the 
particulars  
It is impossible to think 
about (abstract the 
general term extension) 
“extension which is 
neither line, surface nor 
solid, nor has any figure 
or magnitude, but is an 
idea entirely prescinded 
from all these” 
(Introduction, p. 8).  
Not Admitted 
(Introduction, 
p. 10)  
Source: adapted from Berkeley, 1952, pp. 405-407  
 
 
(Berkeley, 1952, paragraph 27), and which when it is acting “cannot be of itself 
perceived, but only by the effects which it produceth” (Berkeley, 1952, paragraph 27). 
Spirit is synonymous with “soul” (Berkeley, 1952, paragraph 27; 1957, paragraph 323) 
and unlike material things is a substance knowable intuitively, one might even say, in the 
manner of the “I” in Descartes:  
 
CXXXIX. But it will be objected, that if there is no Idea signified by the Terms 
Soul, Spirit, and Substance, they are wholly insignificant, or have no meaning in 
them. I answer, those Words do mean or signify a real Thing, which is neither an 
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Idea nor like an Idea, but that which perceives Ideas, and Wills, and Reasons about 
them. What I am my self, that which I denote by the Term I, is the same with what 
is meant by Soul or Spiritual Substance. If it be said that this is only quarrelling at a 
Word, and that since the immediate Significations of other Names are by common 
consent called Ideas, no reason can be assigned, why that which is signified by the 
Name Spirit or Soul may not partake in the same Appellation, I answer, All the 
unthinking Objects of the Mind agree, in that they are entirely passive, and their 
Existence consists only in being perceived: Whereas a Soul or Spirit is an active 
Being, whose Existence consists not in being perceived, but in perceiving Ideas and 
Thinking. It is therefore necessary, in order to prevent Equivocation and 
confounding Natures perfectly disagreeing and unlike, that we distinguish between 
Spirit and Idea. See Sect. 27.  
 
CXL. In a large Sense indeed, we may be said to have an Idea, or rather a Notion of 
Spirit, that is, we understand the meaning of the Word, otherwise we could not 
confirm or deny any thing of it. Moreover, as we conceive the Ideas that are in the 
Minds of other Spirits by means of our own, which we suppose to be Resemblances 
of them: So we know other Spirits by means of our own Soul, which in that Sense 
is the Image or Idea of them, it having a like respect to other Spirits, that Blueness 
or Heat by me perceived has to those Ideas perceived by another. (Berkeley, 1952, 
pp. 440-441)  
 
The cause and effect attributes of spirit prove difficult for Berkeley and will be discussed 
only briefly here. Berkeley wrote during in the age of the enlightenment. Freddoso (1988) 
identifies him with Marlebranche (1694) and with Biel and al Ghazali from the middle 
ages as defenders of the position that God is the primary and first cause and only cause of 
effects in nature. The Aristotelians (among them St Thomas Aquinas, Luis de Molina and 
Francesco Suarez) while holding that God is the primary and first cause of natural effects 
(causal relationships) also allowed that each material and corporeal substance possesses 
and exercises its own proper causal powers. These powers (secondary powers) are not 
rendered ineffective or disqualified by God, whose primary causation is a general and 
universal one which concurs with them.  
 
It is in this context that Berkeley’s attack on the primary qualities of Newton, Boyle and 
Lock are to be interpreted. Berkeley’s chief goal (after McCraken [1983, p. 211; cited in 
Freddoso, 1988]) was “to recall Christian philosophy to a recognition of the total and 
immediate dependence of all things on God” (p. 16). Within this context Berkeley the 
immaterialist and metaphysician predicated the soul’s access to the difficult truths about 
causation on a commonsense empirical existence of the natural world. Again science 
(understanding causation) was to be sought through truth.  
 
Soul in the postmodernist era  
 
The emergence of Cartesian dualism precipitated a shift through which “the vegetative 
functions of the soul were assigned to purely material processes, the sensory functions 
were attributed to mind and body, and the purely cognitive (and volitional) functions 
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were assigned to the mind alone” (Hatfield, 1998, p. 6). The soul (psyche) of Aristotelian 
psychology was, during the late 17th century and throughout the 18th and 19th centuries, 
to be replaced by the mind in late modern and postmodern cognitive psychology. Laws of 
mind were sought, and successive generations investigated old mysteries of being and 
knowing using old words with nuances of meaning: ‘sensation’, ‘perception’, 
‘conception’, ‘construction’ and the like. By the dawn of the 20th century in the West, 
God, philosophically speaking, had died (Nietzsche, 1968) and throughout the century 
Hume’s children, as they had long since done, continued to struggle with their legacy 
until they were engulfed in the moral relativism and constructivism so apparent in the 
present time. This shift from soul to mind in cognitive psychology (and its educational 
psychology applications) is the basis used in this paper to transfer discussion of the soul 
from Berkeley to the postmodern researchers discussed in this section. The common 
themes which link the three sections of the paper are the ever present mysteries of what it 
means to be and what it means to know. These postmodern researchers are, in the 
language and conventions of their day, and like Plato and Berkeley before them, 
engaging questions of considerable relevance to pedagogy.  
 
Mansfield (2005), in reviewing a book by Braun (2005), catches one aspect of 
postmodernity well. He speaks of a “just now” (p. 2) characteristic of consciousness – a 
“systematic production of novelty” (p. 2) which elevates method over substance and
which is aided by a modern psychology which replaces soul with self. Knowing the soul 
within is not the same as knowing the “peculiar disposition of yourself”, the latter being 
more amenable to manipulation by experts and “reformers”. Full souled enlightenment, 
which must carefully extinguish the tutelage of others, must also surmount the ephemeral 
ego of self. The next group of researchers are writing in the era of the emphasis on self in 
which metacognition (as charioteer?), and better defined than understood, is central to 
ideas and concept change and development. These researchers (Flavell, 1976; Hewson, 
1982; Hewson & Hewson, 1984; Hewson & Thorley, 1989; Hewson, 1981; Posner et al., 
1982) and others cited below write in the book of the constructivists.  
 
Specifically constructivist research argues that individuals (students) actively construct 
their own understandings of the natural and person-made environments and validate these 
understandings (a) personally, on an “if it works, use it” basis and (b) socially in various 
peer group settings. Consequently, classroom environment, teaching style and delivery 
method, and the prior concept and construct holdings of students, are not the only crucial 
vectors in the process of education. Peer group, social mores, taboo, ritual, convention, 
myth, erotic muse, spirituality and religion are also important. Under constructivism prior 
student construct knowledge holding is central in teaching and learning, but can be 
diverse and capable of contradicting accepted scientific views. Metacognition and 
metaconception are considered crucial to the process of active concept change. In 
particular humans learn how to hold multiple (and sometimes conflicting) “truths” 
simultaneously.  
 
As mentioned, the writers cited two paragraphs above are amongst researchers 
investigating the process of skills acquisition through concept change and development, 
and the efficacy of formal education and training in that process. The literature in this 
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domain now contains discussions about: (a) operational definitions of conceptual 
development and conceptual change; (b) the application of such definitions towards the 
discovery of general guidelines for teaching; and (c) the identification of teacher, learner 
and classroom environment states compatible with those guidelines.  
 
The literature cited above holds that conceptual change can occur: (a) through extinction 
of the prior concept; (b) through strengthening or weakening of the existing concept 
(assimilation or conceptual capture) resulting from its mental articulation; or (c) through 
exchange of one concept for another. Furthermore conceptual change is explained as a 
function of: (a) context (called personal conceptual ecology); and (b) necessary 
conditions for the change itself. Personal conceptual ecology dictates the options for 
choice and the criteria for choice and there is likely to be wide variation in personal 
conceptual ecology. Learners benchmark conditions for concept change against their own 
situation. Essentially conditions are an amalgam of opinions about the intelligibility, 
plausibility and fruitfulness of the alternative concepts, and benchmarking these opinions 
about whether or not to accept the concept change appears to be something akin to 
validation.  
 
Tobin (1996) has identified universal conditions for change (see Table 3) and three 
important educational referents upon which the conditions partly depend. Components of 
metaphor are likewise identified.  
 
Table 3: Tobin’s universals for change and components of referent and metaphor  
 
 
Universal Conditions for Change  
 
 • Belief: viable knowledge which individuals employ for goal achievement.  
 • Action: behaviour predicated upon beliefs and goal aspirations but constrained by ecology 
(context and views about appropriateness). Such behaviour can be observed but linking it to 
beliefs, goal aspiration and appropriateness dimensions is not clear cut.  
 • Referent: that which serves as a guide to action and an organiser of beliefs and actions. Referent 
is thought to be specific to each context.  
 
Three Important Educational Referents  
 
 • teacher’s personal epistemology  
 • beliefs about control  
 • beliefs about restraints  
 
Components of Metaphor  
 
 • a verbal part  
 • an image  
 • contexts within which the metaphor is thought to be viable  
 
Source: adapted from Tobin, 1996, pp. 175-189. 
 
Tobin (1996) points out that change is often sought without due regard being paid to the 
necessary and sufficient antecedent conditions both structural (educational, social, 
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political, power and economic milieu) and mind (reason-interrogated cognition and 
imagination). Under constructivism both personal conceptual ecology and conditions 
cannot be comprised of other than prior construct understandings and it is probably valid 
to wonder whether or not this understanding may not itself be a progeny of a 
postmodernist ‘rediscovery’ or restatement of something like Locke’s position on the 
‘ideas’ stemming from ‘experience’ being defined as sensation and reflection. 
Metacognition is singled out for its importance in the conceptual choice process of the 
individual. Unfortunately, when conditions are right ecology may inhibit acceptance of 
conceptual change as a result of epistemological, cultural or taboo belief holdings.  
 
Implications for teaching follow from the concept change and development findings 
outlined above: (a) clear definition of conceptual change must inform teaching and 
curriculum development; (b) conceptual ecology and learner condition constraints need to 
be considered, in so far as this is possible, in curriculum design and teaching strategy; 
and (c) personal epistemology, in so far as students recognise it or are willing to expose 
it, should also be probed. Ideally learners themselves should: (a) want to understand the 
topic and own the understanding; (b) accept responsibility for their own learning; (c) be 
able to accept differing views about the subject; and (d) be open in themselves to accept 
conceptual change.  
 
The concept development and change literature has also impacted on teaching praxis. 
Educationalists and practising teachers (Tobin, Tippins & Hook, 1994; Tobin & Ulerick, 
1992), realising that conceptual change involves a reordering of constructs in the status 
hierarchy of constructs, have identified three general teaching methods. The first, named 
the analytical approach, focuses on classroom teaching per se. It involves the use of 
educational action and strategy and educational goals, interventions and outcomes 
defined in terms of commonly understood classroom objects, concepts and constructs. 
This is the realm of traditional teaching which employs known tools and techniques. The 
second, the holistic approach, uses metaphor as an image of practice, and through such 
imagination, and the metaphor switching it permits, both to catalyse change and to 
provide a channel for that change. The third approach, the metaphor/analytical, is a 
combination of the first two in which analytical heuristic, although focused on classroom 
phenomena as outlined above, is nevertheless grounded in metaphor and governed by the 
liberating imagination it permits. Perhaps (presumably – it is not spelled out), in the 
analytical approach, reason mainly interrogates cognition; in the holistic approach, reason 
mainly interrogates the imaginative, fantastic, erotic and emotional depths of the soul; in 
the metaphor/analytical approach reason attempts to draw understanding from an 
exploration of linkages and/or transactions that might be found within the cognitive–
imaginative intersection.  
 
Of course irrespective of the teaching method being attempted it is possible that proactive 
and differently gifted students will, of their own volition or habit, be engaged in one of 
the modes as a matter of learning. Other questions are troublesome, especially 
differentiating between concept change per se and concept development per se and 
whether the two can be separated and/or measured in a meaningful way. Nevertheless 
general maxims of teaching method relevant to all three approaches have been identified: 
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(a) the range of prior existing views about a topic should be made explicit; (b) both 
teacher and student should contribute to the cataloguing of these views; and (c) the views 
of both students and teachers should, in the first instance, be considered as equals in that 
they should not attain status on the basis of the status of the utterer.  
 
Figure 1 emerges when categories of teaching and concept change and development are 
matched. It reveals that nine teaching for concept change and development alternatives 
are available and that three teaching methods are available once the kind of concept 
change and development to be taught for has been chosen.  
 
Figure 1: Nine choices in matching teaching method and concept change  
 
 
concept change 
      
    
 
extinguish 
 
 
strengthen or weaken 
 
exchange one for 
another 
      
    
    
      
 
analytical 
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analytical/holistic 
      
  
 teaching method  
 
 
 
Some specific findings about the concept change alternatives in Figure 1 are available. 
Grayson (1996) has found that concept substitution is more suited to situations in which 
the pathway from students’ intuitively held conceptions to the preferred conceptions of 
science is continuous because those intuitive understandings (which unfortunately are 
expressed in inappropriate terminology) are essentially correct.  
 
Duit (1993) has also been active in developing a teaching method helpful in facilitating 
the exchange of one concept for another. The method, known as concept substitution, is 
predicated on the conceptual change research of Confrey and Doerr (1996), and involves 
using a continuous path process in which students’ correct intuitive concepts and 
constructs are reinforced through teaching and learning experiences during which an 
intuitive nomenclature is replaced by the preferred scientific nomenclature. This 
matching of correct prior intuitive understanding with accepted scientific terms helps 
avoid cognitive conflict which can sometimes hinder learning.  
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Other researchers (Duit, 1993; Hewson & Thorley, 1989; Jung, 1986; Minstrell, 1984; 
Scott, Asoko & Driver, 1992) investigating contrastive teaching (a method which 
embraces the theory of teaching for concept change and the constructivist dictum that 
prior construct plays a crucial role in the strength of active construction) have found it 
useful in helping students differentiate between their intuitive views about specific 
science topics and the preferred views claimed by science.  
 
Finally Hewson (1996) has identified teacher roles perceived to be helpful in teaching for 
conceptual change: (a) teacher as manager of appropriate classroom climate – context for 
classroom activity, posing of appropriate questions, unthreatening exploration of 
underlying ideas, task selection and setting and explanation of behaviour ground rules; 
and (b) teacher as active participant – balance between leader voice and discovery 
learning voice, hearing of both student and teacher views, respect for students, wide 
repertoire of teaching material and resource materials and metacognition about his or her 
own understandings about the nature of teaching and learning. The desired classroom 
climate would be one that: (a) respected a multivocality of ideas; (b) provided freedom 
from fear of ridicule because of the expression of ideas which are contrary or because 
they seek further clarification; (c) promoted separation of person from idea in that ideas 
are critiqued yet the person remains affirmed (group work is useful); and (d) predicated 
lesson preparation on the understanding that the general goal of the lesson is the 
acceptance of shared (correct) meanings about a topic adopted for their own intrinsic 
status and not on the basis of teacher ‘say so’. Exogenous factors can constrain progress 
(Ben-Ziv & Hofstein, 1996)  
 
The research cited above under ‘soul’ in the postmodern era is research in the domain of 
science and mathematics education. Much of Berkeley’s work is relevant to science and 
mathematics – his refutation of Newton’s absolute space and time is well known – and 
Plato himself turned away from mathematics (towards studying the soul) because of his 
disenchantment with the occult machinations of the mathematicians he knew. The 
matches of teaching methodology and concept change alternatives of Figure 1 are 
unlikely to offend when actioned in the technical domain – for example, switching one 
concept about magnetism for another. But as soon as they are employed in the domain of 
the social dimensions of science or in the values and humanities domains they can admit 
connotations of indoctrination and social manipulation and can even be considered 
antithetical to the nature of constructivism itself. This is one dilemma for education under 
postmodernism and moral relativism in the age of the soul as self and the ‘just now’ 
ephemerality of values.  
 
Once again the main point of this paper can be made. All of the concept change and 
development strategies discussed involve having students aspire to the accepted view of 
science. The accepted view, as the benchmark, must itself be checked through reasoned 
and careful observation of the phenomena of nature. Lesser forms of validation have little 
value in science and science education. Nor for that matter should lesser forms of 
validation be the basis of the search for strong construction in the social sciences. The 
experience of two millennia, accessed through the writings of even the most metaphysical 
participants in the great conversation, reveals that mind is wont to seek the highest truths 
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by reasoned empirical assessment of the everyday phenomena of nature. This one 
constant hallmark of science should not be sacrificed to less rigorous or less careful forms 
of validation.  
 
 
Conclusion  
 
Empirical observation of the ‘facts’ remains the hallmark of science and science 
education. The ‘just now’ ephemerality of ideas is itself a deception or ignorance 
associated with the soul as self but is outside the soul. If it were to penetrate the soul, by 
replacing reason as the stabilising force in the full souled human, thereby becoming 
something like a lie or defect in the soul (Plato, 1988), the consequences could be serious 
for both the advancement of learning and the growth and development of society. 
 
 
References  
 
Aristotle (1952). De anima [On the soul]. Chicago, IL: William Benton.  
Augustine. (1952). The confessions. In W. Benton (Ed.), The confessions; The city of 
God; On Christian doctrine (vol. 18). Chicago, IL: Encyclopaedia Britannica.  
Ben-Ziv, R., & Hofstein, A. (1996). Strategies for remediating learning difficulties in 
chemistry. In D. F. Treagust, R. Duir & B. Fraser (Eds.), Improving teaching and 
learning in science and mathematics. New York: Teachers College Press.  
Berkeley, G. (1948). Essay towards a new theory of vision. In A. Luce & T. Jessop 
(Eds.), The works of George Berkeley Bishop of Cloyne (vol. 1). London: Thomas 
Nelson and Sons.  
Berkeley, G. (1949). Principles of human knowledge. In A. Luce & T. Jessop (Eds.), The 
works of George Berkeley Bishop of Cloyne (vol. 2). London: Thomas Nelson and 
Sons.  
Berkeley, G. (1952). The principles of human knowledge. Chicago, IL: William Benton.  
Berkeley, G. (1957). Three dialogues between Hylas and Philonous. In A. A. Luce & T. 
E. Jessop (Eds.), The works of George Berkeley Bishop of Cloyne (vol. 2). 
London: Thomas Nelson and Sons.  
Brann, E. (2005). Open secrets, inward prospects: Reflections on world and soul. New 
York: Paul Dry.  
Burnett, J. (1908). Early Greek philosophy. London: Adam and Charles Black.  
Descartes, R. (1955). Meditations on first philosophy. In E. S. Haldane & G. R. T. Ross 
(Eds.), The philosophical works of Descartes (vol. I). New York: Dover 
Publications.  
Duit, R. (1993). A constructivist view of learning science, especially physics. Paper 
presented at the “Curriculum research: Separate disciplines, common goals” 
conference, Hilversum, The Netherlands.  
Flage, D. (2004). George Berkeley (1685-1753). Retrieved May 20, 2005, from 
http://www.utm.edu/research/iep/b/berkeley.htm
Flavell, J. H. (1976). Metacognitive aspects of problem solving. In L. B. Resnick (Ed.), 
The nature of intelligence (pp. 231-235). Leeds, UK: University of Leeds.  
 12
Freddoso, A. J. (1988). Medieval Aristotelianism and the case against secondary 
causation in nature. In T. Morris (Ed.), Divine and human action: Essays in the 
metaphysics of theism. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.  
Grayson, D. (1996). Concept substitution: A strategy for promoting concept change. In 
D. Treagust, R. Duit & B. Fraser (Eds.), Improving teaching and learning in 
science and mathematics (pp. 152-161). New York: Teachers College Press.  
Hatfield, G. (1998). Attention in early scientific psychology. In R. D. Wright (Ed.), 
Visual attention (pp. 3-35). Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.  
Hewson, M. G. (1982). A case study of conceptual change in special relativity: The 
influence of prior knowledge in learning. European Journal of Science Education, 
4, 61-78.  
Hewson, P. (1996). Teaching for conceptual change. In D. F. Treagust, R. Duir & B. 
Fraser (Eds.), Improving teaching and learning in science and mathematics. New 
York: Teachers College Press.  
Hewson, P. H., & Hewson, M. G. (1984). The role of conceptual conflict in conceptual 
change and the design of science instruction. Instructional Science, 13, 1-13.  
Hewson, P. H., & Thorley, N. R. (1989). The conditions of conceptual change in the 
classroom. International Journal of Science Education, 11, 541-553. 
Hewson, P. W. (1981). A conceptual change approach to learning science. European 
Journal of Science Education, 3, 383-396.  
Hobbes, T. (1991). Title Leviathan. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.  
Hume, D. (2005). An enquiry concerning human understanding/Holdings Online 
(netLibrary). Retrieved June 28, 2005, from 
http://ezproxy.usq.edu.au/login?url=http://www.netLibrary.com/urlapi.asp?action
=summary&v=1&bookid=1085904
Jowett, B. (2005a). Introduction and analysis. In The republic; By Plato; written 360 B. 
C. E.; Translated by B. Jowett (vol. 2005, pp. 1-14). Internet Classics Archive 
(http://emotional-literacy-education.com/classic-books-online-b/tmeus10.htm).  
Jowett, B. (2005b). Introduction and analysis. In Timaeus by Plato; Written in 360 
B.C.E.; Translated by B. Jowett. (pp. 1-58). eBooks@Adelaide.  
Jung, W. (1986). Everyday ideas and learning of physics and chemistry. 
Naturwissenschaften im Unterricht - Physik/Chemie, 34(13), 2-6.  
Locke, J. (1975). An essay concerning human understanding (edited by P. H. Nidditch). 
Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.  
Luce, A. (1944). Editor's notes on the entries. In A. Luce (Ed.), Philosophical 
commentaries: Generally called the commonplace book (An editio diplomatica 
transcribed and edited with introduction and notes by editor). London: Thomas 
Nelson and Sons.  
Mansfield, H. (2005). Great books, American life; From the June 20 issue: The wisdom 
of Eva Brann, tutor and philosopher. Retrieved June 29, 2005, from 
http://www.weeklystandard.com/Utilities/printer_preview.asp?idArticle=5709&R
=C5B520BA2
Marlebranche, P. (1694). Recherche de la verite (translated and edited by T. Taylor). 
London.  
Minstrell, J. M. (1984). Teaching for the development of ideas: Forces on moving 
objects. In C. W. Anderson (Ed.), Observing science classrooms; Observing 
 13
science perspectives from research and practice (pp. 55-73). Colombus, OH: 
Association for the Education of Teachers of Science.  
Nietzsche, F. (1968). Thus spake Zarathustra. New York: Viking Press.  
Pappas, G. (2000). Berkeley's thought. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.  
Piaget, J. (1979). The science of education and the psychology of the child. New York: 
Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich.  
Plato (1988). Republic (translated by S. Halliwell). Warminster, UK: Aris & Phillips.  
Plato (2001). Phaedo. Retrieved December 12, 2001, from 
http://digital.library.upen.edu/webbin/book/search?author=plato&amode=words&
title=&tmode=words
Plato (trans, 2003). Phaedo by Plato: Translated with an introduction by Benjamin 
Jowett. Retrieved June 28, 2005, from 
http://etext.library.adelaide.edu.au/p/p71pho/
Plato (trans, 2005). Timaeus by Plato written 360 B.C.E. translated by B. Jowett. 
Retrieved June 28, 2005, from http://emotional-literacy-education.com/classic-
books-online-b/tmeus10.htm
Posner, G. L., Strike, K. A., Hewson, P. W., & Gertzog, W. A. (1982). Accommodation 
of a scientific conception: Towards a theory of conceptual change. Science 
Education, 66, 211-227 
Scott, P. H., Asoko, H. M., & Driver, R. (1992). Teaching for conceptual change: A 
review of strategies. In R. Duit, F. Goldberg & H. Niedderer (Eds.), Research in 
physics learning: Theoretical issues and empirical studies (pp. 310-329). Kiel, 
Germany: Institute for Science Education, University of Kiel.  
Tobin, K. (1996). Analytical and holistic approaches to research on teacher education. In 
D. Treagust, R. Duit & B. Fraser (Eds.), Improving teaching and learning in 
science and mathematics (pp. 175-189). New York: Teachers College Press.  
Tobin, K., Tippins, D., & Hook, K. (1994). Referents for changing a science curriculum: 
A case study of one teacher's change in beliefs. Science and Education, 3, 245-
264.  
Tobin, K., & Ulerick, S. (1992). An interpretation of high school science teaching based 
on metaphors and beliefs for specific roles. In E. W. Ross, J. W. Cornett & G. 
McCutcheon (Eds.), Teacher personal theorising: Connecting curriculum 
practice, theory and research (pp. 115-136). New York: Columbia University 
Press.  
von Glasersfeld, E. (1995). Radical constructivism: A way of knowing and learning. 
London: Falmer Press.  
 14
